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Home > News & Seminars > Articles > Under New Law, Firms Must Grant Leave To Domestic Abuse Victims Under New Law, Firms Must Grant Leave To Domestic Abuse VictimsOriginally published in the May 2008 edition of Florida Law Focus. Written by Larry Corman and Glenn M. Rissman. On July 1, 2007, a new law went into effect in Florida that requires employers of 50 or more employees to provide a leave of absence to employees who are the victims of domestic violence. To our knowledge, the law is the only Florida statute mandating private-sector employers to provide employees with leave. Although the new law applies to employers who have 50 or more employees, the statute does not mandate that the 50 employees be located in Florida. Until there is clarification through administrative rules or case law, employers with 50 or more employees should heed the statute’s mandate, even if the number of employees actually located in Florida is fewer than 50. Eligibility The statute requires the covered employer to permit an eligible employee to request and take up to three working days of leave in any 12-month period if the employee or a family or household member of the employee is a victim of domestic violence. The employee taking the leave must first exhaust all annual or vacation leave, personal leave, and sick leave, unless the employer waives the requirement to exhaust other accrued leave. The three days of leave under the statute is either paid or unpaid at the employer’s discretion. The statute permits the employee to take the three days of leave to do any of the following:
Advance Notice Employers may not interfere with the employee’s exercise of his or her rights under the statute. Similarly, employers may not discharge, demote, suspend, retaliate, or otherwise discriminate against an employee for exercising his or his rights under the statute. An employee who believes his or her rights were violated may bring a civil suit for damages and equitable relief in state circuit court. As damages, the aggrieved employee may seek all wages and benefits that would have been due to him or her but for the violation of the statute. Covered employers should draft and implement a policy governing leave under the new statute if they have not done so already. Because of this law’s similarity to the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), Florida employers may also wish to review their FMLA leave policies when adopting a policy under the new statute. This would assist them in ensuring consistency in their leave policies and practices. This article was originally published in the Boca Raton/Delray Beach News. Larry Corman, a partner in Hodgson Russ’s Business Litigation and Employment Litigation Practice Groups, concentrates his practice in commercial litigation, employment discrimination, deceptive trade practices, covenants not to compete, and transactional fraud areas. He is admitted to practice in Florida (1983); the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida (1989); and the U.S. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit (1990). As a partner at Hodgson Russ, Glenn M. Rissman focuses his practice primarily on labor and employment litigation involving Title VII, Section 1981, ADA, ADEA, FMLA, the WARN Act, FLSA, ERISA, and the Florida Civil Rights Act. He is admitted to practice in Florida (1991); the U.S. District Courts for the Southern (1991), Middle (1994), and Northern (2005) Districts of Florida; and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits (1991). |
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